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ABSTRACT 
Humans learn complex latent structures from their environments (e.g., natural language, 
mathematics, music, social hierarchies). In cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, 
models that infer higher-order structures from sensory or first-order representations have 
been proposed to account for the complexity and flexibility of human behavior. But how do 
the structures that these models invoke arise in neural systems in the first place? To answer 
this question, we explain how a system can learn latent representational structures (i.e., 
predicates) from experience with wholly unstructured data. During the process of predicate 
learning, an artificial neural network exploits the naturally occurring dynamic properties of 
distributed computing across neuronal assemblies in order to learn predicates, but also to 
combine them compositionally, two computational aspects which appear to be necessary for 
human behavior as per formal theories in multiple domains. We describe how predicates can 
be combined generatively using neural oscillations to achieve human-like extrapolation and 
compositionality in an artificial neural network. The ability to learn predicates from 
experience, to represent structures compositionally, and to extrapolate to unseen data offers 
an inroads to understanding and modeling the most complex human behaviors. 
 
KEYWORDS: predicate learning, artificial neural networks, structured representations, 
neural oscillations, desynchronization, compositionality 
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INTRODUCTION 
As humans, we recognize our home, pet, or partner regardless of our viewing angle and the 
concomitant variation in the 2-D image on our retinas (e.g., [1]). Similarly, when we listen to 
speech or view sign, we understand linguistic structures that go far beyond any physical 
description of the stimulus (e.g., [2-4]). Furthermore, we have the capacity to promiscuously 
apply what we know to new situations, for example, if we have to improvise a recipe with 
novel ingredients, we would never entertain cooking something by refrigerating it.1 These 
examples emphasize two things. First, the ability to use 'incomplete' or partial sensory 
experience to infer latent structures in the environment, and then reason and generalize based 
on them, appears to be crucial for everyday human behavior. Second, the domains where 
humans wildly outperform artificial intelligence systems (AI) seem to involve inference 
beyond lower order statistical relationships [5]. While it is clear that, in the limit, AI can 
outmatch human performance on pure computation and statistical tasks (e.g., medical 
imaging), it is not clear how domains that require inference (e.g., analogy, scene 
comprehension), decision making (e.g., diagnosis, game play), or abstract rule generation 
(e.g., natural language) can be approached without a profound change in the principles of 
computation currently being espoused in both cognitive science and AI (for a discussion see 
[4-7].  
 
In this opinion paper, we argue that the ability to learn representational structure from 
experience and, crucially, to represent structures independently from the particular data and 
context in which they were learned underlies a system's capacity to generalize its knowledge 
to new experiences, contexts, and untrained stimuli in an extrapolatory, human-like way 
[8,9]. We summarize the computational principles needed to achieve structure (i.e., 
compositional or predicate representations) and variable-value independence [5] in a 
distributed computing system in an approach we call predicate learning (Figure 1). Predicate 
learning represents the integration of formal symbolic models with traditional neural 
computing principles and capitalizes on the information carried by oscillatory rhythms of 
neuronal computation.  
 
                                                          
1 For recipes generated by deep learning networks, 
seehttps://www.dailydot.com/unclick/neural-network-recipe-generator/ 
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Advances in AI and machine learning [10] have produced deep neural network (DNN) 
systems that reach and even exceed human levels of performance on a range of cognitive 
tasks [11]. DNNs can learn to perform a variety of tasks without any prior representations or 
knowledge (e.g., to play an Atari video game from pixel data), but it is well known that they 
struggle with tasks that require generalization to input from outside the bounds of the training 
set (c.f., ranging from object recognition, inference, analogy, language; [5]). It is likely that 
DNNs' explicit lack of structured representations plays a role in this struggle because 
accounts of how humans generalize tend to rely on powerful symbolic languages formed 
from structured representations (predicates), which can be generatively applied to new 
arguments [9,12-15]. Structured representations like predicates allow the flexible transfer of 
information across contexts because the same representations can be used to effectively 
characterize wildly different input data (e.g., the relational predicate "beside" can be applied 
to tennis balls in play over nets and to roofs on houses). But current models that exploit 
structured representations face a complementary challenge compared to DNNs: They require 
specification, by the modeler, of a collection of necessary representational structures in 
advance of any actual learning; in other words, they do not learn the contents of their 
structures directly from the environment without the use of pre-specified representations and 
rules [cf. 9,13,14,15]. That is, while structure-based models generalize more flexibly than 
DNNs, they do not perform general "from scratch" learning and often feature powerful 
symbolic languages that were hand-coded by the modeller [e.g., 9,14,15].  As a result, 
structured models often make strong nativist claims, for example, that a large set of 
representational elements and the rules for building compositions of these elements must be 
innate [16].  
 
Providing an account of how structured representations like predicates can be learned from 
experience has proven difficult (e.g., [17]). But, in our view, a demonstration that predicates 
can be learned from experience, and ergo, that information learned in one context can be 
generalized to untrained inputs and contexts, would have substantial impact on theories of 
human reasoning, language representation and processing, and on applications in AI. In order 
to explain how structure is learned, we give a minimum definition of what structure is. If 
structure learned from the environment is crucial to human cognition, why is it so hard for a 
machine system to learn? 
 
Three requirements for structured representations 
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It is important to be clear about what we mean by representations and representational 
systems. A representation is a state of a system that explicitly carries information about 
something else in the world, namely, about how the representational elements of that system 
carry information about that thing (e.g., a painting of a sandwich is a representation of that 
sandwich where the representational elements are paint and the configuration of the paint 
such that it resembles the sandwich; an equation is a representation of a particular 
mathematical system composed of representational elements like variables and operators in 
that system). Thus, a representational system minimally consists of two things: i) 
representational elements (e.g., nodes, weights, or connections in a neural network, symbols 
in a symbolic model, firing patterns, neurotransmitter dynamics, gene expression, network 
dynamics in biological neural systems) and ii) a set of rules or processes for inferring new 
states from existing states (see [18]). A structured representational system must further 
support the composition (e.g., binding) of basic representational elements into more complex 
structures in a manner that is dynamic (bindings must be created and destroyed on the fly) 
and that maintains the representational independence of the items so bound (e.g., [19,20,21]).  
 
To summarize, for a system to be structured, it must include: (i) states that carry 
information about the world via its representational elements (i.e., specifying what is 
present in a given situation or dataset), (ii) a mechanism that carries dynamic binding 
information (specifying how those elements are arranged), and (iii) processes by which new 
representational structures are inferred from existing structures.  Crucially, these three 
informational degrees of freedom must be independent (i.e., the binding operator must not 
affect the meaning of the bound items; [6,7]). Any system that can represent these three 
independent sources of information can, in principle, support structured representations. In 
the following example, we use distribution over the neural network space, activation values, 
and time as our three independent informational degrees of freedom. 
 
Predicate learning: detection of invariance through intersective comparison  
A system that can learn structure from experience bridges the gap between the general 
flexibility of deep learning and the formal power of structured systems. In this section, we 
briefly describe how a system can discover functionally symbolic representations from 
experience by exploiting basic neurophysiological mechanisms in a process we call predicate 
learning. The representations learned in this way allow a system to generalize and transfer 
that expertise in a human-like fashion, quickly (in one shot) and without explicit feedback 
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[4,8,22] because predicate structures can be applied generatively and compositionally.  
The architecture, called DORA (Discovery of Relations by Analogy; [4,8,22]), is descended 
from the symbolic-connectionist system LISA [13, 23] and is based on two fundamental 
concepts from cognitive science and neuroscience. The first concept is that learning and 
generalization depend upon a process of comparison [24]. The second is that information in 
neural computing systems can be carried by the oscillatory regularities that emerge as its 
component units fire [25,26]. Unsupervised comparison is used to discover which 
characteristics of the input are invariant (see Figure 2). The common pattern of distributed 
activation that occurs across many inputs to the network is discovered by calculating the 
intersection across the inputs' activation states. The distributed pattern that is common (i.e., 
the intersection itself) is a latent structure. The intersection becomes an activation state of the 
network that is separable from the inputs from which it was learned, and thus forms a 
functional predicate (when combined with dynamic binding) that reflects the latent invariants 
in the dataset or environment.  
During predicate learning, the system uses oscillatory regularities in the network to 
dynamically bind predicates and arguments, without fundamentally changing the meaning of 
any elements so bound (though statistics about the binding can be tracked). Crucial to the 
comparison learning algorithm is the fact that the DORA architecture features banks of 
layered units that are connected to a common pool of feature units. Activation flows from one 
bank (e.g., the current attentional state of the model) to other banks (e.g., active memory and 
long-term memory) via these shared feature units. DORA maps (i.e., learns connections 
between) corresponding coactive units across banks using a modified Hebbian learning 
algorithm [13,23], allowing for comparison of activation states related to the input. In sum, 
the system assumes (a) a layered architecture, with banks of layered units connected to a 
common pool of feature units, (b) lateral inhibition between units in the layered banks, (c) 
yoked inhibitors on units that accumulate input from their yoked units, and units at higher 
layers, and (d) the capacity for Hebbian learning. There is ample evidence for these basic 
architectural and computational features in the human neuroscience literature [27]. As a result 
of these architectural principles, DORA learns representations that are functionally and 
formally symbolic from training data, without feedback, and without requiring that structured 
representations be specified a priori. Full details of the model’s operation appear in [8] and 
[22]. The model has been used to capture a wide range of phenomena in the development of 
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relational reasoning and analogy [22], in the cortical tracking of linguistic structures [4], and 
to extrapolate predicates learned from one video game in order to play a different, untrained 
game [8]. 
Neural oscillations as the rhythms of computation 
Predicate learning exploits a core set of neurophysiological computing principles, namely that 
computation in a neural network is rhythmic. Most crucially, predicates, once learned, are 
dynamically bound to their arguments by phase-lag, which is expressed as systematic 
asynchrony of unit firing [25,26,28], or desynchronization between the activation cycles of 
the nodes coding predicates and arguments (Figure 3). During asynchrony-based—or phase-
lag-1—binding, as a predicate or proposition becomes active, bound arguments and 
predicates fire in direct sequence, and out of synchrony with other bound predicate-
arguments sets. This feature is what allows the system to maintain independence between a 
predicate and its argument(s), and achieve variable-value independence [29]. At the same 
time, binding information is carried in the proximity of firing (e.g., with predicates firing 
directly before their arguments), meaning that representing predicates in a neural system 
relies critically on sensitivity to time, and rhythm, as dimensions of computation. Synchrony-
based—or phase-lag-0—binding also occurs in the system depending on the computational 
goal, for example, a proposition can be activated by having its bound arguments and 
predicate-argument roles fire together, but out of synchrony with other bound role-filler sets, 
in order to perform propositional-level computation of higher arities. By grouping 
representations into phase sets, or what is in and out of phase in the network, the system uses 
the rhythms of computation to both separate and combine information as needed. 
Cortical oscillations have long been implicated as the indices of neural information 
processing [30]. Predicate learning in an artificial neural network relies on exploiting the 
naturally occurring “neural” oscillations of distributed computation over time. Being 
sensitive to how information is carried in time in a neural system implies that the dynamics of 
the system can themselves be learned from. A similar principle appears in the dynamic 
reorganization of cortical networks during learning in humans (e.g., [31]). Using oscillatory 
assembly activation to compute and to learn is potentially transformative, not only for its 
computational power (e.g., being able to learn from past states and learn relations over 
multiple time points and states), but also for the mechanistic link to neuroscientific theory 
and data (neural oscillations), and to formal accounts of cognition, including formalism of 
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natural language and predicate calculi [15,16,32].Computing with neural oscillations 
represents a fundamental formal and neurophysiological synthesis between how human-like 
representations can be achieved in an artificial system that learns, and how distributed neural 
computing systems, including cortical assemblies in biological brains, process information.  
 
Towards compositionality and generative representational systems 
Predicate learning offers an account of how complex concepts might develop in neural 
computation systems without the need to hardwire or encode a priori structure, a theoretical 
and implementational limitation of current structure-based accounts of cognition (e.g., 
[9,15,16]), and offers a solution to the classic generalization problem that unstructured deep-
learning systems face (e.g., [5,11]). These advances also relate to both the formal and 
functional senses of generative models - formally, because the information in predicate 
representations can entail a joint probability distribution that can be used to determine a given 
variable's probability based on another's, and functionally, because learned predicate calculi 
supports both the inference that allows the user to postulate a probable cause for an observed 
signal and the capacity to generate representational structures, through the composition of 
existing representations, as per the demands of the environment and of human behavior. 
Generative models, whether structured or not, have long been important in cognitive science 
(e.g., [33,34]) and AI (e.g., [35]), and in neuroscience (e.g., [36]). However, similar to the 
extrapolatory generalization problem faced by DNNs, unstructured deep generative models 
require extensive labelling of training data [37] and superhuman training routines [5]. In 
contrast, a system that uses predicate learning can discover and predicate what is latent in the 
environment, and discover what is relevant for behavior.  Predicate learning ultimately relies 
on the capacity of a system to be compositional - to host representations that can be combined 
in order to generate new representations. 
 
In sum, we have described in brief how predicates can be learned from unstructured data 
using intersective comparison and rhythmic, desynchronized neural oscillations. Learning 
symbolic structure from signals that naturally occur in distributed computing systems offers a 
promising approach whereby the computational principles that can yield the highest forms of 
the human mind (e.g., relational reasoning, formal and natural language processing) can also 
be realized in systems based on the computational primitives of neurophysiology.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Visual summary of the main concepts, claims, and definitions in the text 
Figure 2. Cartoon illustration of predicate learning through intersection discovery 
Figure 3. Cartoon illustration of rhythmic computation of predicate-argument 
structures through neuronal assembly desynchronization 
 
The core claims of predicate learning 
 
• learning structured representations that 
support extrapolatory generalization and 
compositionality in neural systems are 
crucial for human behavior 
 
• functionally symbolic structures can be 
learned from unstructured data using 
sensitivity to time as a informational degree 
of freedom 
 
• predicate learning can be implemented via 
desynchronization of neuronal assemblies 
predicate learning: a series of algorithms that perform intersective comparison and 
 uses rhythmic computation to discover latent structures  
 
rhythmic computation: the exploitation of endogenous neural oscillations, such as  
 (de)synchronization of aggregate unit firing over time, to compute separable 
 information types over multiple timescales. 
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